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The recent outpouring of English language scholarship on Plotinus continues unabated.  Specialised 
commentaries on individual tracts of the Enneads (Atkinson on V.1, OUP, 1983 and more recently 
Fleet on III.6, OUP, 1995) have given way to more general works such as O’Meara’s Introduction 
to the Enneads (OUP, 1993) and L.P. Gerson’s monograph on Plotinus in the Arguments of the 
Philosophers Series for Routledge, (see below).  With MacKenna’s masterful translation now 
available in Penguin (abridged by J. Dillon) it now seems an opportune time for CUP to include 
Plotinus in its Companion series. 
 
L.P. Gerson, the editor of the Plotinus Companion acknowledges that Plotinus (P) must be 
understood in the context of a long and weighty philosophical tradition and structures the sixteen 
contributions to that end.  We are given first, by the editor, a brief context for and outline of P.’s 
philosophy.  The first essay by M.L. Gatti expands on P.’s place in the philosophical tradition and 
shows that he was as much an innovator as an exegete of Plato.  The following three essays 
(Bussanich, O’Meara and Blumenthal) attempt to present a coherent picture of the metaphysical 
structure of his world and our place in it.  The next six essays (Corrigan, Wagner, O’Brien, Smith, 
Emilsson and Rappe) focus on specific philosophical problems which emerge from his 
metaphysics.  There follows three essays (Clark, Leroux and Dillon) which concern themselves 
more with our ontological status as human beings and how we might be expected to live in P.’s 
world.  To non-specialists this will probably be the most interesting part of the book.  One essay 
(Schroeder) is devoted to P.’s use of language before the collection terminates with two final essays 
(D’Ancona Costa and Rist) which attempt to assess the later history of Neoplatonism and its clash 
with Christianity.  Overall, the scope of the volume is impressive, beginning as it does with P.’s 
philosophical sources and concluding with P.’s influence on Augustine.  Yet the reader should not 
be mislead, most of the book is devoted to explaining what exactly it is that Plotinus is saying in 
the Enneads.  
 
Every complex topic presents its own special difficulties when one tries to give a somewhat simple 
view of it.  P. is no exception.  Apart from linguistic difficulties, his Greek is notoriously difficult; 
there is also the problem of finding a consistent point of view on any particular topic.  A.H. 
Armstrong pointed to the ‘tensions’ in P.’s thought while S. MacKenna, according to E.R. Dodds, 
was blunter when he wondered ‘how much of the obscurity in the Enneads was due to the subtlety 
of the thought and how much to the general human idiocy from which philosophers are not 
immune’.  All the more difficult then for a team of specialist scholars to keep the arguments simple 
and clear.  By and large they are successful.  In most cases the topics assigned to each of the 
specialists is in an area that they have worked on for a number of years.  The reader thus benefits in 
that s/he receives heavily considered opinions on various aspects of P.’s philosophy. 
 
This is particularly true of essays two to four where P.’s metaphysics is examined.  A description of 
the One, Intellect and Soul is presented and the derivation of Intellect and Soul from the One is 
assessed.  Blumenthal’s essay on Soul and Intellect is particularly lucid and thus very helpful for 
the beginner.  It should also be noted that in general the contributors quote reasonable amounts of 
the text which gives the reader an opportunity to assess the strength of the arguments presented.  
Bussanich in particular, in his essay on the One, allows the reader to witness the sometimes forced 
exegesis necessary to allow P. to maintain a consistent argument.  The order of these three essays is 
also clever in that O’Meara and Blumenthal’s essays complement well Bussanich’s account of the 
One in that they focus on what the One produces.   
 
The next six essays examine specific issues in the Enneads.  The essays by Corrigan on ‘Essence 
and Existence’, Wagner on ‘The Nature of Physical Reality’, Smith on ‘Eternity and Time’, 
Emilsson on ‘Cognition and its object’ and Rappe on ‘Self-knowledge and subjectivity’, are well 
written accounts but are perhaps overly detailed for a book of this sort.  O’Brien is an exception 
here in that his essay seems to me, at least, to be pitched to just the right level.  His account of 
‘Matter and Evil’ displays a long acquaintance with this topic and the reader benefits from a clear 
and lucid consideration of the evidence. 
 
The next three essays by Clark, Leroux and Dillon focus on the position of the human being in the 
philosophy of the Enneads.  Clark discusses the technical aspects of the relationship between body 
and soul.  In an interesting discussion, he attempts to isolate what we are and how we are related to 
body.  He does give due attention to the idea of a guiding ‘daimon’, a much neglected topic in most 
work on P., but does not in my opinion, treat sufficiently the area of human consciousness.  We 
exist at whatever conscious level we choose to operate on.  Leroux’s essay ties in well with this 
topic in that it is concerned with just this idea: how free are we?  How free is our actual descent 
into body?  Leroux rightly notes that this is a problem inherited from Plato, made more difficult by 
the addition of vocabulary from Aristotle’s Ethics, such as, voluntary and involuntary, willed and 
not willed.  Interesting material indeed.  This is valuable background for Dillon’s critique of P.’s 
ethical theory.  This is a stimulating essay on a much neglected aspect of P.’s philosophy.  Dillon 
makes many valuable points, but fails in my view to reconcile the ethical theory that one finds in 
the Enneads with the ethical theory practised by P.  We have a vivid description of the way P. acted 
from Porphyry’s ‘Life of Plotinus’ but this modus vivendi does not tally with the prescriptions in 
the Enneads.  If the main task of the philosopher is to return to the One, why should s/he bother 
with anyone else?  Yet P. certainly did. 
 
The final two essays look at P.’s impact on later philosophy and the subsequent development of 
Neoplatonic thought.  D’Ancona Costa pursues a narrower focus than Rist when she examines later 
problems associated with the causality of the First Principle.  Proclus is her main interest here.  
Rist’s essay roams further afield as he presents a masterful survey of P.’s influence on later 
Christian thinkers.  Interestingly enough he concludes that the specific influence of P. on Greek 
Christian thought down to the late fourth century was rather limited.  This changed however with 
the arrival of Augustine, a figure that Rist has recently written about at some length, (Augustine: 
Ancient Thought Baptized, CUP, 1994).  Augustine’s sources for Neoplatonism and its subsequent 
impact on his thinking are clearly presented. 
 
On the Companion then I finish on a note I sounded earlier, that is, its strength lies in the fact that 
the contributors are specialists who are able to clarify the main problems and present the issues in a 
clear manner.  On a critical note, I am uncertain what ‘unwritten writings’ means on p. 24 and I 
noticed misprints on pp. 98, 254, 275, 286, 300 and 396. 
 
In contrast to the Companion L.P. Gerson’s Plotinus in the Arguments of the Philosophers Series is 
definitely not for the beginner.  Gerson admits (p.225) “that this is a difficult book” and sensibly 
tries to apportion some of the blame for this to P.  He fails to make clear where he contributes to 
this difficulty himself.  In my opinion, it lies in his use of an unnecessarily wide range of difficult 
vocabulary. ‘Asymptotically’ (p.201) was one of a number of words that drove me to a dictionary.   
This serves only to obscure P.’s already tangled thought.  That aside, the reader of this book will 
find him/herself suitably rewarded.  Gerson presents a very stimulating analysis of P.’s philosophy, 
supporting his arguments with substantial notes. These are conveniently located at the end of the 
book (pp. 227-293) which helps preserve the fluency of the text itself.     
 
The book is divided into two parts.  The first part generally concerns itself with the structure of P.’s 
metaphysical hierarchy while the second part focuses on the place of the human being in that 
structure.  This book on P. is not a systematic treatment of the usual kind but rather a selection of 
particular topics thoroughly discussed. Gerson’s stated objective has been to focus on the 
philosophy of P. and as a result the book presents a series of highly specialised essays 
concentrating on what he considers are the most philosophically significant arguments.  By his own 
admission he has omitted the more exotic areas in the Enneads but in a series entitled Arguments of 
the Philosophers this is a reasonable approach.  The result is a fairly eclectic study of P. and 
anyone looking for a general appraisal of the life and work of the man from Lycopolis should look 
elsewhere. 
 
Having chosen his parameters, Gerson delivers a heavily considered view of the important 
philosophical issues at the heart of the Enneads.  Although he acknowledges that P. is primarily a 
Platonist and not simply an anti-Aristotelian, he suggests that much can be gained from reading the 
Enneads as ‘a paradigm of anti-Aristotelianism’ (p.225) and thus he explores P.’s philosophy as 
Platonism reconstructed in the light of Aristotelian critique.  Gerson suggests that P.’s very 
originality lies in this reconstruction of Plato in the face of criticism from other philosophical 
schools.  Chief amongst the critics was Aristotle and Gerson believes P.’s school studied the 
commentaries on Aristotle in part for what they could tell him about Plato.  What is beyond doubt 
is that even although P. sought to interpret Plato in the light of Aristotelian criticism he had no 
compunction in using Aristotelian ideas to help structure that revision.  Because Gerson believes 
that P. was helped in his understanding of Plato through the criticisms of Aristotle, in many 
instances his methodology consists in beginning with an assessment of P.’s response to Aristotle’s 
critique of Plato. 
 
Because of its subject matter, essentially the three hypostases, the first part of the book is 
reasonably technical and the non-specialist will probably find the second half of the book more 
accessible. In this second section Gerson tries to establish the place and role of the human being in 
P.’s ontology.  The technical vocabulary in this section might be less daunting but Gerson 
demonstrates that it is still quite difficult at times to establish with certainty P.’s position regarding 
the endowed self.  The strength of this book lies in Gerson’s insistence on the necessity of 
understanding P.’s place in his philosophical tradition but, for the general reader, this is also its 
weakness.  
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